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Introduction
Victimisation through migration  5
Dear Mr Rector Magnificus
Dear Mrs Dean of Tilburg Law School
Ladies and Gentlemen
 Refugees attempting to escape Africa do not claim a right of admission to Europe. 
They demand only that Europe, the cradle of human rights idealism and the 
birthplace of the rule of law, cease closing its doors to people in despair who have 
fled from arbitrariness and brutality. That is a very modest plea, vindicated by the 
European Convention on Human Rights. “We should not close our ears to it.” 
(Concurring opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque in the Hirsi Case, appl. 27765/09, 2012)
This afternoon I would like to take you on a virtual journey. It will not be a 
pleasant journey, but it is a journey that many people have taken, and are still 
taking – sometimes voluntarily, sometimes forced by others or by war, disaster, or 
oppression. I am talking about migration.
Although migration can create opportunities – opportunities for people to 
improve their lives and living conditions – the focus of my inaugural address 
is on those who have been less fortunate in their journey; those who have been 
victimised during the migration process. Victimisation through migration can 
occur because the movement was flawed from the beginning, for instance, when 
people are fleeing war or are recruited by smugglers or traffickers. Sometimes 
migrants experience abuse and exploitation along the way. Victimisation can 
also occur in the destination country, if the situation is one of exploitation and 
exclusion. 
During our journey we will first learn about the ways in which migrants and 
refugees are victimised while migrating. For those who know my work it will 
be no surprise that the focus will be on victims of trafficking, exploitation and 
smuggling. We will then follow the plight of these victims once they arrive in 
Europe by critically analysing the response to the arrival of these victims at the 
EU level and at the national level in EU member states. Then, finally, I will 
make some suggestions on how to improve the situation and identify some of 
the knowledge gaps that require further research. But before we embark on this 
migration journey, I will explain the terminology that I use and paint a broader 
picture of the migration process in which the victimisation takes place. 
6  Victimisation through migration
Terminology
Who are we talking about? Throughout this lecture I will use the terms ‘migrants’ 
and ‘refugees’. In the narrow definition provided by the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
‘refugees’ are those persons who flee their country because of persecution and 
who are unable to return due to risk of such persecution - referred to as the 
principle of non-refoulement. In the context of the EU and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the principle of non-refoulement also applies 
in situations of torture, inhumane treatment or real risk of serious harm.1 This 
implies ongoing war and indiscriminate violence. 
I will be using the term refugee regardless of whether or not refugee status has 
been formally determined by an official authority, all the more because many 
states hosting refugees do not apply the Refugee Convention and its protocol.2 
I will use the term migrant to refer to all other people who are on the move and 
who cross borders – some regularly, others irregularly, some with a specific goal 
(e.g., to apply for asylum, find a job), others without such a goal. Apart from 
refugees and migrants there are internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are 
forced to flee their homes, but remain within their own country. This category can 
also be victimised in the same way as migrants and refugees, but the main focus 
of this lecture is on those who cross borders. 
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), one in seven 
persons in the world today is a migrant or refugee. In 2015, the number of 
refugees and migrants surpassed 244 million, growing at a faster rate than the 
global population. There are roughly 65 million forcibly displaced persons, 
including over 21 million refugees, 3 million asylum-seekers and over 40 million 
internally displaced persons.3
Looking at the moral and normative foundations of the distinction between 
migrants and refugees, and regardless of debate on the scope of the term refugee, 
1  Critical on the adoption of non-refoulement in the European context is J. Mink, ‘EU Asylum Law and 
Human Rights Protection: Revisiting the Principle of Non-refoulement and the Prohibition of Torture 
and Other Forms of Ill-treatment’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 14 (2012), pp. 119–149. Art. 
15 Qualification Directive, 2011/95/EU.
2 C. Healy, Targeting Vulnerabilities. The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Situation on Trafficking in 
Persons, ICMPD (2015), pp. 23–27 (hereinafter ICMPD).
3  High Level Meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, Draft Declaration, 5 
August (2016) (hereinafter HLM draft declaration).
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there is a broad consensus that states have a duty to offer some form of asylum 
and protection to those in need.4 Hugo Grotius already recognised that options 
must be available for individuals who want to migrate and asylum for those living 
in exile.5 In Europe, the tradition of asylum is often traced back to the Reforma-
tion, when groups of foreign Protestants were allowed to establish themselves 
in other countries. The first refugee laws refer to refugees as persons in need of 
protection and are linked to the concept of extradition.6 These early laws prohib-
ited the extradition of political offenders, but allowed the extradition of criminal 
offenders. 
Nowadays, and based on the Refugee Convention, the legal definition of refugee is 
exclusively reserved for those who fear persecution on one of the grounds listed in 
Article 1 of the convention. The right to seek asylum, based on Article 14(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights, is equally limited, namely, to those who 
fear persecution. The vast majority of those fleeing today are on the move because 
of armed conflict, war or natural disaster. It is debated whether or not these refu-
gees fall under the protection of the Refugee Convention7, either as a refugee or 
under the principle of non-refoulement in Article 33 of the convention. 8 
Alexander Betts introduces the term ‘survival migration’ to refer to people who 
leave to survive an existing threat against which their own country fails to protect 
4 M. Gibney, ‘Political Theory, Ethics, and Forced Migration’, in: E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Refugee and forced Migration Studies, OUP, (2014), pp. 49-50.
5 A. Grahl-Madsen, ‘The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee law’, Journal 
of Peace Research, 3(3), 278-89 (1966).
6 A. Grahl-Madsen, op. cit., f.n. 5, pp. 280-281.
7 Perluss and Hartmann argued that this is a rule of customary international law in D. Perluss and J. 
F. Hartman, ‘Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm’, Virginia Journal of International 
law, Vol. 26:3, (1986), however contested by K. Hailbronner, ‘Non-refoulement and ‘Humanitarian’ 
Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?’ And (although less firm) 
G. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement and the new Asylum Seekers’, both in: Virginia Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 26:4, (1986). 
8 The definition in Article 1 of the refugee convention very much reflects the context of the time 
when the convention was adopted in 1951. Nowadays other reasons force people to move such as 
climate change, state fragility, food insecurity. Strictly speaking people forced to leave their country 
because of another reason than persecution fall outside the scope of the refugee convention. Reason 
why many scholars plea to revise or extent this definition and to bring it more in line with the 
needs of today’s world. See A. Betts, ‘The Normative Terrain of the Global Refugee Regime’, Ethics 
& International Affairs, 29(4), (2015) pp. 363–375 and scholars cited in the article. Betss defines a 
new group of migrants ‘survival migrants’.  A. Betts, Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the 
Crisis of Displacement, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (2013). Others plea for a more conservative 
interpretation. G. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The International Law of Refugee Protection’, in E. Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh et al. (eds) op. cit., f.n. 4, pp. 36- 45.
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them.9 Consequently, the group of recipients of protection becomes much larger. 
The difficulty with a narrow and strict understanding of who is a refugee and 
who is not is that it creates the risk of distinguishing between a small group of 
‘deserving refugees’ (those who fulfil the convention definition) and ‘undeserving 
refugees’ (those who do not).10 Furthermore, it leaves the states with (too) broad a 
discretion to determine their obligations vis a vis other forms of forced migration, 
including survival migration.
Why do people migrate? Contextualising migration
People have always moved in search of new opportunities, to escape poverty 
and conflict, and increasingly to escape environmental degradation and natural 
disasters. However, it is sad to say that the number of refugees and migrants 
worldwide has not been so high since the Second World War, and persistent 
Western media reports using phrases such as ‘migration influx’, ‘tsunami of 
migrants’ and ‘refugee crisis’ have fuelled feelings of being overwhelmed and ‘out 
of control’. 
Let me start by trying to unravel some of the stereotypes around these migration 
flows. The first stereotype is that the Western world is the most affected by the 
increase in refugees and migrants. In fact, figures show the opposite. Most of the 
refugees and migrants try to find a safe or better place in the neighbourhood of 
their home country. Today, some 86% of the world’s refugees are in developing 
regions.11 
A second stereotype is that most refugees find shelter and humanitarian 
assistance in refugee camps. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) figures show the opposite; today the majority of refugees go to cities, 
where they try to rebuild their lives. This category of refugees is called ‘urban 
refugees’, and we will have a closer look at this group later. 
A third stereotype is that refugees and migrants want to come to Europe and 
Western countries in Europe, but research show that at least some of them do not 
9 A. Betts (2013), op. cit., f.n. 8, A. Betts, ‘Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework’, Global 
Governance 16 (2010), 361-382. He defines survival migration as: “persons who are outside their 
country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy 
or solution”. The existential threat is a threat to a basic rights; basic liberty, basic security, and basic 
subsistence. Current refugee law only focusses on basic security.
10 Gibney, op cit., f.n. 4, pp. 51-55.
11 UNHCR, Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2014, June 18, 2015.
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have a concrete plan to go to Europe when they leave their home country and that 
some prefer to remain in a country close to their home country so they can return 
as soon as it is safe to go back.12 This is one of the reasons why so many Syrian 
refugees have sought refuge in Lebanon and Jordan. 
Let us have a closer look at this. The willingness of refugees and migrants to go 
back creates opportunities for the voluntary and well-prepared return of those 
migrants and refugees. Interesting ideas on how to prepare refugees to return 
and contribute to rebuilding their home countries have been articulated by Betts 
and Collier. They suggest that “a post-conflict economy even prior to peace [set up 
in the host country] […] could jump-start Syria’s future recovery”. Education and 
employment in the country of exile could help to achieve this and, once peace is 
achieved in Syria or parts of Syria, a Syrian economy in exile would be waiting to 
return. According to studies on return migration, return policies and the success 
of such policies are determined by three interrelated elements: the context in 
the migrants’ home country; the duration and type of the migration experience 
abroad; and the pre- and post-return conditions in the home and host countries.13 
The rich array of studies on return migration focus on the re-integration of 
returnees, the motivations for return migration, and the return policies from 
multidisciplinary perspectives. More recently, return policies and circular 
migration are increasingly being linked to development in the home state. Hence, 
the time is right to take the next step in our thinking about return migration and 
switch the focus to the preparation and facilitation of return migration in the host 
country with the ultimate goal of contributing to rebuilding the home country in 
post-war or post-conflict situations, or in situations of transitional justice after 
12 Research among Syrians by CARE revealed that 40% of the interviewed Syrian families would like 
to go back to Syria, CARE, Five Years into Exile. The challenges face by Syrian refugees outside camps in 
Jordan and how they and their host communities are coping, Amman, June 30, (2015) p. 23 (hereinafter 
CARE (2015). Also:  M. Phillips and K. Starup, ‘The Syria crisis, displacement and protection. 
Protection challenges of mobility’, Forced Migration Review, (September 2014). However, contrasting 
literature exists on whether or not migrants and refugees do have a concrete plan for their final 
destination upon departure. See for instance: K. Kuschminder, et al. ‘Irregular Migration Routes to 
Europe and Factors Influencing Migrants’ Destination Choices’, WODC, (2015) p. 14. GIATOC, Smuggled 
Futures: The dangerous path of the migrant from Africa to Europe, research report, (May 2014) p. 4 
(hereinafter GIATOC). They report that only 10 to 15% of the Africans who leave their country arrive in 
the EU.
13 J. Cassarino, ‘Theorising return migration: the conceptual approach to return migrants revisited’, 
International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 6(2), p. 253-279. J. Cassarino, ‘Return migration and 
development. The significance of migration cycles’, in: A. Trandafyllidou (ed.), Routledge handbook of 
Immigration and Refugee Studies, (2016) pp. 216-217. Also M. Gibney, op cit., f.n. 4, pp. 56-57.
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regime change. I will explain later how I would like to contribute to research on 
return migration in the future, together with other colleagues and third parties. 
Back to the contextualisation of migration. Options to legally migrate to the 
EU are limited and exist only for refugees and those migrants who are highly 
skilled or can otherwise contribute to the (economic) interests of the EU or the 
destination country. The efforts of the Western world, and especially Europe, are 
aimed at tightening borders and preventing refugees and migrants from coming 
to the EU. Such policies push people to turn to smuggling networks to migrate 
irregularly, either with forged documents or without documents.14 If one does 
not belong to the group of recognised ‘deserving refugees’ or to the select group 
of ‘deserving migrants’ (those who serve an economic interest), options to legally 
migrate are limited. This can lead people to embark on a difficult and dangerous 
journey. 
In many cases the travel route is not planned in advance by the migrant or 
refugee. If the move is planned, the migrant most likely has some money for 
the first leg of the journey, either from their own savings or borrowed from 
community members. They are often ‘helped’ by people who offer to arrange the 
journey and employment in the destination country. These migration agents or 
smugglers charge large amounts of money. Between 80 and 90% of the migrants 
coming to the EU are facilitated by migrant smugglers or criminal groups.15 In 
some cases migrants enter into arrangements in which they pay for their travel 
afterwards.16 These migrants become bound to the migration ‘service provider’. 
In other cases, for example, when people flee war, they are less prepared and the 
journey commences unexpectedly. These people have less options to direct and 
determine their destination and are dependent on others. Although migration can 
be beneficial, both migrants and refugees are exposed to dangers and suffering 
during their journey. 
14 Düvell, F. ‘Transit Migration in the European Migration Spaces: Politics, Determinants and 
Dynamics’ In F. C. Düvell, Transit Migration in Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 
(2014), pp. 209-236 also S. Castles, et al. The Age of Migration, Palgrave McMillan, (2014) p.5-6, 
123–125. 
15  GIATOC op. cit., f.n.12.
16  J. O’Connell Davidson, ‘Troubling freedom: migration, debt, and modern slavery’, Migration 
Studies, (2013) pp. 1-20, GAITOC, op. cit., f.n. 12, pp. 7–13. 
Victimisation through migration  11
12  Victimisation through migration
II
Victimisation en route
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Extensive research for the European Commission on the smuggling of migrants 
has shown that migrants gather in cities and places from which they can easily 
migrate or continue their migration, where there are opportunities to arrange 
papers, work and transport, and where information on how to proceed can be 
gathered.17 These so-called ‘migration hubs’ are not static, but change over time. 
These places are also a hub for human smugglers and traffickers. If people run 
out of money or are fleeing war or oppressive regimes, they are easy targets for 
human traffickers and criminals, who take advantage of the desperate situation of 
these migrants and refugees. So let us look at the different types of victimisation 
en route.
Human smuggling
Human smuggling is a widespread phenomenon. One only needs to look to the 
Mediterranean Sea, where boats are crossing and arriving in Italy on a daily basis. 
With the adoption of a protocol on human trafficking and a protocol on human 
smuggling to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, these 
two criminal acts were legally separated. However, in practice they are not so 
easy to distinguish. Trafficking and smuggling overlap and are often intertwined, 
especially nowadays with the increase in violent smuggling practices.   
The international legal definition of smuggling reads as follow: “the procurement, 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the 
illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or 
a permanent resident”.18 Profit making is the ultimate aim of the smuggling and, 
in that sense, it is closely linked to human trafficking, which has the exploitation 
of the trafficked person as its purpose. The distinguishing element between 
trafficking and smuggling is force or coercion, which is present in trafficking, but 
not in smuggling. 
Given the modus operandi of many migrant smugglers, who use blackmail, 
extortion and misleading information to smuggle people, there is a clear overlap 
17  European Commission, A study on smuggling of Migrants, September 2015, Also Europol-Interpol 
joint report Migrant Smuggling Networks, executive Summary (May 2016), GIATOC op. cit., f.n. 12.  
18 Smuggling protocol to the UN Convention on transnational organised crime, New York, 
15 November 2000.
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with what is considered human trafficking.19 The overlap in the legal framing 
of both crimes is not necessarily problematic, but it does have some important 
consequences. The trafficked person is considered a victim in need of protection 
and assistance, while the smuggled person is primarily considered an illegal 
migrant. Some scholars even pointed out that the distinction between trafficking 
and smuggling was introduced to separate ‘victims’ from ‘migrants’, and the 
‘innocent’ from the ‘guilty’.20 Thus, from a victim’s perspective, the lens through 
which a situation is viewed is important. 
In the EU, it was realised as early as 2004 that the dividing line between 
smuggling and trafficking is blurred and that a smuggled person might also 
deserve victim status. In the Directive on Short-term Residence Permits for 
victims of trafficking and those who have been subjected to smuggling and who 
cooperate with the authorities 21 an option was created to extend the scope of 
the directive to grant the same protection and assistance provided to victims of 
human trafficking to persons who have been smuggled; it reads as follows: 
Article 3 of Directive 2004/81 
1. Member States shall apply this Directive to the third-country nationals who 
are, or have been victims of offences related to the trafficking in human 
beings, even if they have illegally entered the territory of the Member States.
2. Member States may apply this Directive to the third-country nationals who 
have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration.
Only a limited number of EU member states have applied this extension, and the 
granting of a residence permit and protection to those who have been smuggled, 
but not trafficked, seems to be rare.22 
19 Also M. Ventrella, ‘Recognising Effective Legal Protection to People Smuggled at Sea, by 
Reviewing the EU Legal Framework on Human Trafficking and Solidarity between Member States’, 
Social Inclusion,  Volume 3 issue 1, (2015) pp. 76–87. C. Rijken and H. van Bruggen, ‘Hoe kan 
mensensmokkel worden aangepakt?’, A&MR, (2016) no. 6/7, pp. 285-290.
20 W. Chapkis ‘Trafficking, Migration, and the law Protecting Innocents, punishing Immigrants’, 
Gender and Society (2003), J. Srikantiah, ‘Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in 
Domestic Human Trafficking Law’, Boston University Law Review, vol. 87, (2007).  
21  Directive 2004/81, on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of 
trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, 
who cooperate with the competent authorities, 29 April 2004.
22 M. Ventrella, Smuggling of Migrants, Trafficking in Human Beings and Irregular Migration on a 
Comparative Perspective, European Law Journal, Vol. 12, issue 1, (2006) pp. 106–129.
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Smuggling that turns into trafficking 
What is more common today in migratory processes is smuggling that turns 
into trafficking. Triandafyllidou identified three ways in which smuggling can 
turn into trafficking.23 First, and as mentioned earlier, refugees and migrants are 
increasingly indebted when they commence or continue the migration process. 
This indebtedness to the smugglers creates dependency and can result in refugees 
and migrants ending up in exploitative situations. Labour and prostitution are 
common ways of paying off such debts.24 The link with the smugglers network 
continues after the border crossing, as the smugglers keep ‘control’ of the 
migrant until he or she pays back the debt. A second way in which smuggling 
can turn into trafficking is when migrants are subjected to exploitation, not by 
the smugglers, but by other persons who exploit them after they have arrived in 
the destination country. Migrants who have been smuggled across borders are 
generally undocumented and have no option to work legally, making them easy 
targets for exploitation. A third way is when migrants run out of money while en 
route and need to collect money for onward migration, making them easy targets 
for traffickers.25 
An example of smuggling turning into trafficking during migration is provided 
by Eritreans who flee their country and find a way via smugglers to a city nearby 
or a place where they can make a living. While en route, they are completely 
dependent on the goodwill of the smugglers for their safety. Such migrants are 
easily taken advantage of exploited, robbed and abused. Trafficking for ransom is 
only one of the evils that may befall them. 
Trafficking for ransom
Trafficking for ransom is another form of victimisation en route. Mirjam 
van Reisen, Meron Estefanos and I documented the modus operandi of the 
traffickers and criminal groups involved in this practice in the Sinai. Based on the 
testimonies of 200 people who were trafficked and held hostage, we identified a 
new form of trafficking, which we labelled ‘Sinai trafficking’.26 More recently, 
23 A. Triandafyllidou, Migrant Smuggling, in: A. Trandafyllidou (ed.), op. cit., f.n. 13, p. 351.
24 J. O’Connell Davidson, op. cit., f.n. 16, GIATOC, op. cit., f.n. 12.
25 GIATOC, op. cit., f.n. 12, pp. 15–17.
26  M. van Reisen et.al., Human Trafficking in the Sinai: Refugees between Life and Death, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, (2012), and The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond, Wolf Legal Publishers, (2014).
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this form of trafficking has been called ‘trafficking for ransom’,27 as this criminal 
activity is unfortunately practised on a larger scale in the whole northern part of 
Africa as well as in other parts of the world where people are desperate to migrate. 
A Somali man was convicted for this form of trafficking in 2015, revealing the 
modus operandi. The man came to the attention of Italian authorities after the 
Lampedusa disaster, in which 366 people, mainly Eritreans, perished when their 
boat sank off Lampedusa on 3 October 2013. Shortly after this disaster, a Somali 
man arrived in a camp in Lampedusa, causing an outcry among the Eritreans 
residing in the camp. Angry Eritreans tried to assault the man, who they 
recognised the head of a criminal group that had kidnapped and tortured them. 
From the testimonies heard during the hearing, the modus operandi of this 
criminal group can be distilled. The criminal group headed by the Somali man, 
kidnapped a group of Eritreans while they were making their way through the 
desert to Libya and held them hostage under surveillance in the desert between 
Libya, Chad and Sudan. The Eritreans testified that during the hostage taking they 
were beaten, tortured and raped. They were with a group of about 130 persons 
and each of them had to pay 3,300 USD before they could continue their journey 
to Tripoli in Libya. After arriving in Tripoli, they were transferred from one 
smuggler to another and kept in a warehouse or collection camp. An estimated 
600 persons resided in the camp, where they received only a little food and water. 
After approximately one month and paying another 1,600 USD per person, they 
were put on a boat to Italy. Mainly based on these testimonies, the Somali man 
was convicted and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in Italy. The verdict was 
upheld in an appeal in spring 2016.28 This example shows once more how human 
smuggling and human trafficking are intertwined.29 
Exploitation and human trafficking after fleeing war
Many refugees and migrants become victims of human trafficking during the 
migration process following situations of war. Olivier Peyroux, a French 
sociologist, studied trafficking in conflict and post-conflict situations. He 
identifies the horrific and large-scale abuse of people, especially children and 
27 M.O. Brhane, ‘Trafficking in Persons for Ransom and the Need to Expand the Interpretation of 
Article 3 of the UN Trafficking Protocol’, Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 4, (2015) pp. 120—141.
28 Rijken and van Bruggen, op. cit., f.n. 19. 
29 Also, Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central Mediterranean Route, joint 
report SAHAN and IDAG, February 2016. 
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women, in conflict and post-conflict situations.30 He reports on early and forced 
marriage for the purpose of exploitation, including abduction by armed groups for 
the purpose of sexual slavery.31 Such abductions have been reported in Kirkuk and 
Mosul (Iraq) and in the border areas of Iraq and Syria.32 
The fact that refugees and migrants have limited access to the labour market, 
because refugees are not allowed to work or because migrants do not have legal 
status, fosters large-scale labour exploitation. With an increase in the number of 
refugees, an increase in child labour is visible in many sectors of the (informal) 
labour market. These two factors (low wages and a large supply of cheap labour) 
put pressure on local economies and constrict opportunities for local citizens to 
earn income. 
Many refugees are accommodated in informal camps. Sometimes refugees, 
including refugee children, are obliged to do fieldwork for the landlord on whose 
private property a refugee camp has been built. In some ‘informal settlements’ 
refugees have to pay for their tent, electricity and day-to-day expenses. The amount 
of these expenses obligates refugees to work and to send their children to work.33 
They often find employment through an intermediary who negotiates the salary 
and deducts the expenses for living in the camp. Even though Syrian refugees 
have a right to work in Turkey since October 2014, only a small number have 
obtained a work permit; the rest work illegally.34 Other forms of trafficking and 
exploitation that are taking place as a consequence of vulnerabilities following the 
Syrian war are forced begging, including child begging, and domestic servitude.
Survival sex, rape, survival marriage, and other forms of exploitation
The sale of sexual services out of complete lack of alternative options to make 
money to survive, as well as the early marriage of children often of a young age, 
30 O. Peyroux, Trafficking in Human Beings in conflict and post-conflict situation, (June 2015).
31  Although trafficking for the removal of organs, for criminal activities and child soldiering as a form 
of human trafficking have anecdotally been reported, the number of testimonies, the absence of solid 
proof and references for these testimonies forces us to be careful in dwelling on research findings 
and drawing conclusions. For those reasons the main focus in this address in on trafficking for forced 
prostitution and forced sexual services and labour exploitation. 
32  Peyroux, op. cit., f.n. 30, p. 17.
33  ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, pp. 96–97.
34 ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, p. 100.
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are widely reported.35 Syrian refugees (as well as Syrian IDPs and those living 
in warzones) are in such a desperate financial situation that they resort to risky 
coping strategies in an effort to survive, rendering them more vulnerable to 
exploitative practices.36 Gender discrimination in Syria, as well as adjoining states, 
combined with the absence of male family members, who have either died in 
the Syrian war or have taken up arms, adds to these practices. A report by the 
International Centre for Migration Policy and Development (ICMPD) describes a 
case that is illustrative of these practices:37
“Armed men linked to the FSA [Free Syrian Army] facilitated the internal move-
ment of a female-headed family from Homs governorate down the River Jordan 
valley towards the Jordanian border. They then requested a large sum of money 
for the continuation of the journey. When the family refused to pay, one of the 
daughters was raped by the two facilitators, and then the family were abandoned.”
Along the Turkish Syrian border, Syrian go-betweens are active in recruiting and 
selling girls and women to Turkish men, who are often much older. These young 
girls are forced by a family member to accept such arrangements, because the 
money paid helps the family to survive. Interviews conducted by Peyroux with 
these girls and young women reveal that between USD 150 and 200 is paid for 
them. Often these girls (and their adult male family members who agreed to sell 
them) are misled about the financial and marital situation of the ‘husband’ and, 
in many cases, the girl becomes the second or third wife. Such marriages are 
also concluded as a means to provide protection to the young girls.38 For Syrian 
refugees, giving daughters in marriage to a foreign man, whether or not via an 
intermediary, is born out of a desire to provide a better future for their daughters. 
They are often unaware of the risks and the fate that is awaiting these girls.
Another form of forced sexual services is the practice of ‘temporary marriage’, 
also called ‘survival marriage’.39 Temporary marriages are used to facilitate 
35  Peyroux, op. cit., f.n. 30, p.17, ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2.
36 ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, pp.22, 155–164,  also IRC, Syria: A Regional Crisis, (2013), UNHCR, 
Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, (2014) UNICEF, A Study on early marriage in 
Jordan, 2014, Amnesty International,Struggling to Survive: Refugees from Syria in Turkey, (2014).
37  ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, p. 84.
38 Bureau National Rapporteur on Human Trafficking, Vulnerability up Close. An exploratory study into 
the vulnerability of children to human trafficking, The Hague, (2016) pp. 41-67.
39  ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, pp.160–161.
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sexual relations outside a formal marriage and, to that end, men marry a girl for 
a short period of time, sometimes no longer than 24 hours. If the girl is repu-
diated afterwards, she often faces shame and exclusion from her family, even if 
they were instrumental in the temporary marriage. These girls must then fend 
for themselves and, in their attempts to survive, often fall into prostitution. The 
structural and institutionalised recruitment of girls for temporary marriages 
through small offices has been reported in northern Lebanon and Jordan.40 
Similar patterns apply to other refugees in comparably desperate situations. 
Especially when refugee families or women are not accommodated in refugee 
camps, exploitation in the form of prostitution and labour are omnipresent.41 
Recruiters and traffickers know that the victims are unlikely to report the abuse 
or any criminal acts to the police, because often they are illegally residing in the 
country and are discriminated against as women. The same applies if women 
and girls are forced to perform sexual services in return for economic advantages, 
such as housing, a job or money. Some landlords in the south of Turkey (Hatay 
and Sanliurfa) offer their houses or apartments for free if the woman or girl 
prostitutes herself and provides the landlord with the financial gains from 
prostitution.42 The performance of sexual services to meet such basic needs is 
called ‘survival sex’.43 
More than half of the 21.3 million refugees worldwide are under the age of 18. 
This is an alarming number. And the extremely vulnerable position of 
unaccompanied minors is particularly worrisome.44 From previous research 
among Nigerian unaccompanied minors who went missing after arriving in the 
Netherlands, we know that a number of them ended up in forced prostitution.45 
Minors are also exploited in the form of forced begging, child labour and forced 
40 ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, p. 155– Running out of Time, Harvard FXB Center, (January 2014) USA.
41 Peyroux, op. cit., f.n. 30,  p. 21.
42 ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, p. 143.
43 ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, p. 154–155. Reports on survival sex in refugee camps see; Running out of Time, 
Harvard FXB Center, January 2014, USA. 
44 Europol indicated 10 000 registered unaccompanied minors went missing in the EU, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/30/fears-for-missing-child-refugees. On street children in 
Beirut see “Lebanon inter-agency update Street Children”, UNHCR, (May 2015). 
45 Koolvis case; https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/legislation-and-case-law-case-law/koolvis-case_en 
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criminal activities.46 In the ICMPD report, the most astonishing finding is that 
most of the exploitation “is not carried out by organised transnational groups, 
but rather involves family members, acquaintances and neighbours. Families 
and communities displaced by the war are often left with no viable alternatives 
for survival other than situations that can be characterised as exploitation”.47 
Consequently, children are not even safe while they are with their families. Some 
families send their children to Europe in the hope that the family will be allowed 
to join the child later.48 But are victims of trafficking safe in the EU or in any 
country of destination?
Finally safe? Victimisation in the country of destination – Urban refugees
The term ‘country of destination’, from the perspective of a refugee, is a fluid 
concept. What might be the first country or place of destination might turn out 
to be just a stop on a long migratory journey. Sometimes people can be stuck in 
a place for years because they cannot continue on their journey due to lack of 
money or, on a positive note, because they discover that the place does provide 
shelter and opportunities to rebuild their life. Refugees in countries adjacent to 
Syria, such as Lebanon or Jordan, who have been in a refugee camp for years may 
decide to go to Beirut, Turkey or even the EU now that they realise that a peaceful 
solution in Syria is not likely in the near future.49 However, in large cities or new 
countries of destination new challenges, risks and marginalisation await them. 
Migrants and refugees in or outside Europe still face risks of exploitation, for 
instance, because they are indebted to human smugglers or because their legal 
status is uncertain. Urban Refugees are particularly vulnerable. 
The organisation UrbanRefugees.org claims that 58% of refugees now live in 
cities. The UNHCR estimates that more than 10 million refugees and 27 million 
IDPs live in urban areas outside official refugee camps. These people are denied 
access to the camps or avoid the traditional refugee camps because of the poor 
living and security conditions and the lack of prospects for the future. Instead 
46 Research by Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center in 2012 among 1957 Iraqi refugee children revealed 
that most children were working in small shops, food services, beautician, street vendor, construction 
and tailoring. Also “Lebanon inter-agency update Street Children”, UNHCR, (May 2015). In Turkey they 
mainly work in textile factories or sell food on the streets. They also work in workshops set up by 
Syrian refugees. Sexual exploitation of minors has been reported in Turkey as well.
47 ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, Foreword. 
48 ICMPD, op. cit., f.n. 2, p. 91.
49 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12.
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they seek or need to seek opportunities in urban areas. Although most camps are 
supposed to be temporary, refugees are often stuck for years, and even decades, in 
these camps, putting their lives and the lives of their children on hold.50 According 
to Betts and Collier, the average length of stay in camps by refugees is 17 years. 
Many prefer the insecurity of living in urban areas over staying as a registered 
refugee in a camp, where their movement is controlled and opportunities to 
generate income limited.51 
Many refugees think that cities provide them more opportunities to live their life, 
regain control and build a future. However, this does not automatically mean that 
they have better opportunities for integration. Segregation is not only achieved 
by spatial control, but by denying migrants and refugees access to services, job 
opportunities, and equal treatment.52 In this shadow society,53 urban refugees 
find ways to survive and make a living. They often remain unreported and 
undocumented and are, thereby, deprived of assistance from the international 
community. Without access to basic services, such as schooling and health care, 
living life as invisibles, they are extremely vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and 
ill-treatment, including discrimination and violence.54 I will refer to this group 
as ‘urban refugees’, although it is a mixed group that includes irregular and 
undocumented migrants, refused asylum seekers, and unregistered refugees.
Although much remains unknown about the whereabouts of urban refugees, 
intensive research by CARE Jordan reports in detail the living conditions, 
vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms of Syrian refugees living in urban areas 
50 M. Smith, ‘Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity’, World Refugee Survey 
2004, pp. 38–56.
51  A. Fábos and G. Kibreab, ‘Urban Refugees: Introduction’, Refuge, vol. 24, issue 1.
52  Fábos and Kibreab, op. cit., f.n. 51, G. Noll, ‘Why Human Rights Fail to Protect Undocumented 
Migrants’, European journal of Migration and Law, 12 (2010), pp. 241-272. 
53 This is a variation to shadow economy; C. Williams and F. Schneider, Measuring the Global Shadow 
Economy
The Prevalence of Informal Work and Labour, Edward Elgar Publishing, (2016).
54 M. Anderson, C. Beston, ´Helping young refugees avoid exploitative living arrangements´, Forced 
Migration Review, 40, p. 24.
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of Jordan.55 The vast majority of Syrian refugees who have found refuge in 
Jordan live outside the camps, mostly in cities (81% of the registered refugees).56 
As a consequence, rental prices initially increased and, although they have 
now dropped again, rent remains problematic for nearly 80% of the families 
interviewed by CARE. 
Deprivation of health and education services is another important problem.57 
Although almost 90% of the refugees interviewed did have access to food 
vouchers from the World Food Programme (WFP) however, since WFP cut its 
services in 2014, many Syrian families are in need of food.58 Individuals reported 
health-related needs and accommodation needs as most pressing.59 Because of a 
lack of income generating opportunities, Syrian refugees, like poor Jordanian 
families, lack adequate resources to meet their most essential needs.60 For 
this reason 89% of Syrian households are indebted to their family, landlord, 
neighbours or shopkeepers, which puts them at risk of exploitation, including 
labour exploitation, sexual exploitation, involuntary marriage, and child labour.61 
Two-thirds (67%) of Syrian families who have found refuge in Jordan are 
considered extremely vulnerable.62 Problems related to inability to show 
documents increasingly prevent them from making use of services, such as for 
health care and UNHCR support.63 The stressors experienced increase with the 
duration of the stay in exile.64 
55 CARE Jordan, Lives Unseen: Urban Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Host Communities. Three Years into 
the Syria Crisis, Amman, April 2014, (hereinafter (CARE 2014)) and CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12. Also 
R. Al Akash and K. Boswall, ‘Listening to the Voices of Syrian Women and Girls Living as Urban Refugees 
in Northern Jordan: a narrative Ethnography of early marriage’ available at: 
http://www.karenboswall.com/a-narrative-ethnography-of-early-marriag. Matthew R. Stevens, ‘The collapse 
of social networks among Syrian refugees in urban Jordan’, Contemporary Levant, 1:1, 51–63, (2016). 
D. Carrion, ‘Jordan and Syrian Refugees: Avoiding the Worst Case Scenario’, Middle East Law and 
Governance, 7 (2015) 319–335.
56 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12, p. 11.
57 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12. pp.5, 24–25, 26–31, 33–42.
58 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12 pp. 5, 31–33.
59 CARE, (2014), op. cit., f.n. 55, pp. 24–30.
60 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12, pp, 60–65.
61 CARE (2014), op. cit., f.n. 55 pp. 10, 26. 33% of the Syrian female headed households in Jordan is in 
debt with their landlord. CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12, pp. 45–51, 59.
62 Based on the scoring of the CARE Vulnerability Score Card, CARE (2014), op. cit., f.n. 55, p. 47.
63 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12, pp. 5, 25, 43–45.
64 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12, pp. 5, 25–26, 51–52.
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Apart from these studies by CARE,65 some research has also been conducted on 
urban refugees in Africa66  (e.g., in Dar es Salaam,67 Cairo68, Nairobi,69 and 
Lebanon70) and Asia (e.g., in Bangkok71) by researchers from various disciplines, 
including economics, anthropology, geography, and the political sciences, among 
others. Up until now, research on urban refugees in European cities has been 
very limited, which is the reason why Hein Fleuren and I, in close cooperation 
with the humanitarian organisation CARE, have decided to conduct research on 
urban refugees in Athens and Thessaloniki in Greece. Through interdisciplinary 
research, we hope to gain a better and more complete picture of the situations of 
urban refugees in Europe. Under our supervision, students from diverse schools 
at Tilburg University will collect primary data on the scope, living and working 
conditions, and way of life of urban refugees in Athens and Thessaloniki. 
This research will take place in the realm of the programme Data Science for 
Humanitarian Innovation, an initiative by the Data Science Centre, Tilburg. In 
this context, the term ‘innovation’ does not so much refer to inventing something 
new, as it does to adapting something to a different context. Innovation can be 
generally understood as a process of adaptation and improvement.72 
Humanitarian innovation is also about how organisations and actors can work 
together in a creative way to achieve innovative results. That is exactly what 
we will do; we will use methods and outcomes from earlier research on illegal 
immigrants in Amsterdam conducted by Lisa Berntsen, Tesseltje de Lange and 
myself for the Institute Gak. Furthermore, we will build on other earlier research 
65 CARE (2015), op. cit., f.n. 12, CARE (2014), op. cit., f.n. 55.
66 D. Nyaoro, ´Policing with Prejudice: How Policing Exacerbates Poverty among Urban Refugees, 
The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 14, no. 1, (February 2010) pp. 126–145. L. Stark, et al., 
‘He always thinks he is nothing’: The psychosocial impact of discrimination on adolescent refugees 
in urban Uganda, Social Science & Medicine, 146 (2015) 173–181. J. Anderson, ´Urban displacement and 
peacebuilding: an analysis of South African social cohesion interventions´, George Washington University, 
UNHCR Research Paper no. 243, (August 2012).
67 A. O’Loghlen, The nexus of displacement and urbanisation: assessing the asset vulnerability and livelihood 
strategies of urban refugees in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, paper, (2015).
68 K. Grabsak, Marginalization in urban Spaces of the Global South: Urban Refugees in Cairo, Journal 
of Refugee Studies Vol. 19, no 3, (2006).
69 D. Beversluis et al., ´Developing and Validating the Refugee Integration Scale in Nairobi, Kenya’, 
Journal of Refugee Studies, (2016).
70 N. Yassin, N. Stel, R. Rassi, Organized Chaos: Informal Institution Building among Palestinian 
Refugees in the Maashouk Gathering in South Lebanon, Journal of Refugee Studies, (2016).
71  UNHCR Protection Challenges for Urban Refugees in Thailand, (April 2009).
72 A. Betts, Introduction: Refugees and innovation, Forced Migration Review, (September 2014).
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on the human rights situation, especially the living and working conditions, 
of illegal migrants – fully aware of the fact that illegal migrants and urban 
refugees are not the same. Although both groups differ regarding their options 
and opportunities to participate in the formal economy and society,73 they 
both have to creatively engage and mobilise social networks in search of viable 
livelihoods, which Dáddario et al., calls ‘bridging social capital’. Using insights 
from geography and based on the absorption theory, it is argued that anyone 
who lives in an urban area faces similar or the same issues. This theory aims at 
strengthening communities in such a way they are more able to deal with the 
sudden growth of the population and take advantage of such growth.74 
Now that we have seen how refugees and migrants become victims of trafficking, 
smuggling and other forms of exploitation, let us look at the response to 
victimisation during migration. What kind of protection is provided to those who 
have been victimised during migration after their arrival in the EU?
73 Also K. Grabska, op. cit., f.n. 68. 
74 E. Lyytinen, A Tale of Three cities: Internal displacement, urbanization and humanitarian action in 
Abidja, Khartoum and Mogadishu. New Issues in Refugee Research, no. 173, Geneva UNHCR, (2009).
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As we saw earlier, refugees and migrants fall within different legal regimes and 
have different options for protection. For refugees, these options are based on 
refugee law and, in particular, the Refugee Convention. For migrants who arrive 
in Europe without prior permission the picture is more diverse and pessimistic. 
In line with Betts, the UN, in its first high-level meeting on global migration in 
September this year, reiterated that both refugees and migrants have the same 
universal human rights.75 The declaration adopted recalled that “We reaffirm, 
and will fully protect, the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless 
of status; all are rights holders”. But how has this commitment materialised in 
practice in Europe, a strong human rights advocate itself, and in EU member 
states, which are all bound by the core human rights treaties, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the “fundamental rights … as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States”, as articulated 
in Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the EU? And more important for our 
focus, what kind of protection are those who have been victims of trafficking and 
smuggling entitled to?  
Protection for migrants and refugees in the EU
Let us start with the first question on the human rights protection of refugees 
and migrants. One does not need to look far to see that the fundamental rights of 
refugees and migrants are violated in EU member states. Numerous reports from 
human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch76 testify to this and, earlier this year, the Netherlands Institute for Human 
Rights concluded that, in some cases, the way asylum seekers are accommodated 
in the Netherlands can be detrimental, because of a lack of privacy, lack of useful 
daily activities and lack of policies to protect vulnerable groups.77 According to 
Betts “our common humanity should be the basis of recognizing our moral 
obligation” to help those who are in need.78 Interconnectedness in a globalised 
world and a drive for global justice and global stability create obligations to 
contribute to achieving that goal and give rise to an obligation to share the burden 
75 HLM draft declaration, op. cit., f.n. 3, point 15 and 16.
76 Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands, (2011), Amnesty International Trapped in Greece, 
An unavoidable Refugee Crisis, (2016), Lives Adrift: Refugees and Migrants in Peril in the Central 
Mediterranean, (2014), The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations against Migrants 
and Refugees at Europe’s Borders, (2014), https://euobserver.com/migration/134184
77 Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, Aanbevelingen Mensenrechten in Noodopvang Heumensoord, 
(2016). 
78 Betts (2015), op. cit., f.n. 8, p. 365.
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fairly, including in relation to refugees.79 This obligation goes much further 
than merely protecting refugees who fall within the narrow definition under the 
Refugee Convention. 
Based on these moral foundations of our humanitarian obligation, drawing 
a dividing line between refugees and migrants in which refugees are granted 
protection and the rest – including those who flee war, drought, or state 
oppression – are denied such protection, is undesirable. It leads to the exclusion 
of migrants who, based on our humanitarian obligations, should be included.80 
Human rights are not for a privileged select group of deserving refugees, but are 
inalienable – you have human rights because you are a human being.81 
Unfortunately, whether or not you can execute these rights very much depends 
on whether or not you are included in a nation state, the global economy or a 
social group, or in Ignatieff’s words:  ‘Without a nation’s protection, everything 
that an individual values can be rendered worthless’.82 Gregor Noll explains 
the limitations of human rights and the reasons why they are not fit to protect 
undocumented migrants.83 He does not deny the fact that some human rights 
are considered universal, but recognises the inability of undocumented migrants 
to claim these rights. He states that, because of the constant threat of expulsion, 
undocumented migrants isolate themselves from the host country society and, 
consequently, “are insulated from attempts to be ‘given’ human rights by a host 
state. Furthermore, and due to the emphasis of territorial jurisdiction denying 
rights to those not legally present on a state’s territory, human rights cannot 
protect undocumented migrants”, he claims. Such a reading, however, disregards 
the applicability of human rights to all persons present on the territory of a state 
and falling under the jurisdiction of that state. Thus, not limiting the applicability 
79 T. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge, Polity Press, (2002).
80 Betts (2015), op. cit., f.n. 8.
81 M. Dembour and T. Kelley (eds), Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status 
of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States Routledge, (2011); C. van den Anker and I. van 
Liempt, Human Rights and Migration. Trafficking for Forced labour, Palgrave Macmillan, (2012).
82 M. Ignatieff, ‘The Last Refuge’, in: M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New 
Nationalism, FSG Books, New York, (1993) pp. 3-10; also H. Arendt, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State 
and the End of the Rights of Man’, in H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism’, HBW, inc. New York, 
(1966) pp. 267-290.
83 Noll, op. cit., f.n. 52; Gibney (2014), op. cit., f.n. 4; also J. Amaya-Castro, Illegality Regimes and the 
Ongoing Transformation of Contemporary Citizenship, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4 issue 
2, 2011, p. 137–161.
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of human rights to those legally present. He, furthermore, denies a duty on behalf 
of states to ‘bring’ human rights to undocumented migrants. 
We see these patterns reflected in how undocumented migrants and unregistered 
refugees are treated in Europe. In Greece and Italy many migrants and refugees 
are not registered and live a life on the margins of society. In many other 
countries, including the Netherlands, undocumented migrants are denied the 
right to participate in society. 
The situation in Greece and Italy is even more worrisome, because as boarder 
countries the number of those arriving irregularly is much higher than in other 
EU member states.84 Eurostat estimates over 900.000 migrants found to be 
illegally present in Greece in 2015.85 One of the reasons why those migrants do 
not register or come forward is because their chances of obtaining residency, 
either as a refugee or migrant, are very low. Another reason is that they do 
not want to remain in Italy or Greece, but would be obliged to process their 
application there if they register. Therefore, they try to circumvent the system by 
not registering and by trying to find a way to continue their journey to one of the 
northern European states. Again, human smugglers and traffickers await, to profit 
from their precarious situation.86 Over the last couple of years the Dublin system, 
which is largely responsible for creating such behaviour and the unequal division 
of migrants and refugees among EU member states, has, deservedly, been subject 
to severe criticism.87
The solidarity gap 
Because of the Dublin Regulation, the refugee crisis is sometimes referred to as a 
‘solidarity crisis’, referring to the inability and unwillingness of other EU member 
states to help Greece and Italy to address the large number of migrants that these 
84 See for instance, C. Morehouse and M. Blomfield, Irregular Migration in Europe, MPI, (2011).
85 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eipre&lang=en 
86 Rijken and van Bruggen (2016), op. cit., f.n. 19.
87 E.g. M. Fullerton, ‘Asylum Crisis Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European 
Human Rights Law’  29 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 57 (2016);  J. Brekke and G. Brochmann, 
‘Stuck in Transit: Secondary Migration of Asylum Seekers in Europe, National Differences, and the 
Dublin Regulation’, Journal of Refugee Studies, (2014);  E. Brouwer, ‘Mutual Trust and the Dublin 
Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof Asylum Crisis 
Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European Human Rights Law’ 9 Utrecht Law Review 
135 (2013). 
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countries are receiving. Even worse, by closing the Balkan route (borders between 
Greece and Macedonia and Hungary and Serbia), migrants and refugees are stuck 
in Greece.88 The EU-Turkey deal and compulsory registration in so-called hotspots 
on five of the Greek islands has turned these hotspots, and in some cases whole 
islands, into detention centres, because the migrants and refugees are not allowed 
to take the ferry to the Greek mainland. Regardless of agreements to resettle 
160,000 migrants and refugees from Italy and Greece in 2015, the efforts made 
by other EU member states to bring European solidarity into practice are lacking. 
Instead, the Netherlands for instance is closing its reception centres because 
the number of spontaneous arrivals has decreased. As such, the opportunity to 
facilitate controlled arrivals to alleviate the situation in Greece and Italy and to 
redeem its promise to share the burden remain unused.   
An obligation to share the burden has been identified by Alexander Betts as one of 
the two key components of the global refugee regime. Citing Gibney he argues 
that, based on the universal humanitarian and moral obligation to help those in 
need, states are obliged to help other states in need, e.g., when they face a high 
influx of migrants and refugees.89 In contrast to asylum, the second key 
component of the global refugee regime, the norms relating to burden sharing are 
“weak and largely discretionary”.90 The European counterpart of burden sharing 
is adopted in the principle of solidarity and codified in Article 80 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU,91 which reads as follows:
  Article 80: The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implemen-
tation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsi-
bility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever 
necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appro-
priate measures to give effect to this principle.
The full impact and normative implications of solidarity in relation to asylum and 
immigration are researched by Lukasz Dziedzic in his PhD research, who I have 
88 Amnesty InternationaI, Trapped in Greece, (2016), Samos: Inside Greece’s ‘nightmare’ EU hotspot, 
https://euobserver.com/migration/134184 
89 M. Gibney, The Ethics of Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University press, (2004).
90 Betts (2015), op. cit., f.n. 8, pp. 363–375.
91 P. Vimont, Migration in Europe. Bridging the Solidarity Gap, Carnegie Europe, (September 2016).
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the privilege to supervise together with my colleague Hans Lindahl. In my view, 
solidarity is one of the principal fundaments of the European Union, but, 
surprisingly, its foundations are little researched.92 It is still widely debated 
whether solidarity is a precondition for, a means of, or a final outcome of the EU 
polity.93 Already in 1939, long before the European Union was established, 
Hayek in one sentence articulated the essential foundation for a federation or an 
interstate political order, from which the principle of solidarity as a precondition 
for supranational governance is reflected.94 He said that:
 “…although, in the national state, the submission to the will of a majority will be 
facilitated by the myth of nationality, it must be clear that people will be reluctant 
to submit to any interference in their daily affairs when the majority which directs 
the government is composed of people of different nationalities and different tradi-
tions.”95 
He further argues that centrality (be it as a federation of a supranational polity like 
the EU) presupposes the existence of common ideals and common values and, 
conversely, this commonality determines the degree of centrality. Thus, the 
question that arise is to what extent does these common ideals and common 
values exist in the EU? Or put more provocative; what is the legitimacy of the EU’s 
supranational polity? And what are the consequences if this commonality is erod-
ing? Many scholars, link the discussion on solidarity with identity.96 
Kymlicka, takes it a step further and argues that social solidarity implies inclusion 
and solidarity only for those who belong to ‘us’. The next question then is who 
belongs to ‘us’ and how will that be determined and by whom.97 These are inter-
esting questions, not only for understanding the concept of solidarity, but also for 
understanding processes of inclusion and exclusion, as well as integration. 
92 A. Sangiovanni, Solidarity in the European Union, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (2013), p. 1–29.
93 Sangiovanni, op cit., f.n. 92, G. De Búrca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity, 
OUP, Oxford, (2005).
94 F. Hayek, The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, New Commonwealth Quarterly, V, 
No.2 September, (1939) pp.131–49.
95 Hayek (1939), op. cit., f.n. 94, p. 265.
96 Also: C. Calhoun, ‘Constitutional patriotism and the public sphere: interests, identity, and solidarity 
in the integration of Europe’, International journal of politics, culture, and society, 18 (3- 4), (2006) 
pp. 257-280. E. Jones, ‘Identity and Solidarity’, in: E. Jones, et.al., (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
European Union, OUP, Oxford, (2012).
97 T. Kymlicka, Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare
Chauvinism, Comparative Migration Studies, (2015), 3:17.
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The externalisation of migration control
As mentioned earlier, the EU’s policy is aimed at closing its borders and keeping 
refugees and migrants away from EU territory. To that end, the EU supports 
assistance and protection in regions of conflict and tries to manage migration 
flows outside the EU. This is part of the externalisation of migration control. 
Western countries and the EU establish agreements with third countries to 
stop migrants from coming to the EU. The EU-Turkey deal is the most famous 
and most discussed, but, the EU, through the Khartoum process, has sought 
cooperation with countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somali and 
Djibouti.98 
However, cooperation with countries that are ruled by oppressive regimes, or that 
lack an effective regime at all, is problematic for various reasons.99 First, because 
it might put refugees and migrants who are sent back to these countries at risk of 
violation of their fundamental rights. This is in violation of the principle of non-
refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement also applies where persons are 
contained in a place where their fundamental rights are at risk.100
Second, a person has the right to apply for asylum, and this right is infringed 
when they are contained in a third country, especially if that third country does 
not have an effective asylum procedure or has a weak reputation for human 
rights. 101  
Third, such cooperation with third countries creates uncertainty about the liability 
of the entity on whose behalf the third country operates in case things go wrong. 
To give an example, it is unclear to what extent Spain is responsible when, 
because of an agreement with Morocco, refugees are stuck in Morocco and are not 
          
98 Critics on the Khartoum process see for instance blog Nick Grinstead: 
https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/khartoum-process-shifting-burden Maximilian Stern, The Khartoum 
Process: Critical Assessment and Policy Recommendations, IAI Working Papers 15/49, (December 2015).
99 See for country information in general Africa Monitors, e.g.https://africamonitors.org/2016/08/29/
sudanese-government-sends-the-janjaweed-against-eritrean-refugees/#more-372. Also letter to British prime 
minister: http://wagingpeace.info/images/Waging_Peace_Letter_to_Theresa_May.pdf 
100 J. Hathaway and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence’, 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 53, no. 2 (2015), pp. 235-84. C. Rijken and N. Oudejans, The 
scope of the principle of non-refoulement in contemporary border management: evolving areas of law, report 
for Fundamental Rights Agency, not published.
101 Specific on the risks of human trafficking see; S. FitzGerald, Vulnerable Bodies, Vulnerable 
Borders: Extraterritoriality and Human Trafficking, Feminist Legal Studies, 20 (2012), p. 227–244. 
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able to seek refuge in Spain. Even more difficult is the situation in Turkey where 
the EU gives financial support to Turkey for stopping refugees and migrants from 
coming to Europe. Although the external dimension to Europe’s migration policy 
should be an integral dimension thereof, it can never replace our own obligations 
in relation to global migration or be a way to meet our international obligations.102 
I am glad to say that Annick Pijnenburg will dedicate the next four years to study 
this topic.
And, finally, the externalisation of migration policy is problematic, because it 
reflects a lack of understanding of reality, as it disregards the increase in 
population movements globally and reveals the unwillingness of the Western 
world, including the EU, to do their share in contributing to a global migration 
solution. This adds to the categorisation of refugees as deserving (those fleeing 
persecution) and undeserving migrants (those fleeing poverty and lack of 
opportunities). Only when the undeserving migrant is a highly-skilled worker who 
is needed in the West can the undeserving migrant become a deserving migrant, 
save under strict conditions. Destination countries compete to attract highly-
skilled workers, but there are no or limited options for low-skilled workers. Even 
though conditions may be tough for undeserving migrants and “manual workers 
and undeserving refugees experience exclusion and discrimination”,103 these 
conditions are often preferred over poverty, insecurity and lack of opportunities at 
home – otherwise migration would not continue.
Protection of victims of trafficking and smuggling
Now let us turn to the second question, namely, what protection and assistance 
is provided to victims of trafficking, other forms of exploitation and smuggling. 
Victims of trafficking are identified as a particular vulnerable group among 
migrants and refugees who require special protection.104 Such special protection 
is sometimes also extended to those who have been subjected to (violent) acts 
of smuggling. Now let us have a closer look at how this special protection 
materialises in practise in destination countries. Because such protection is to 
be granted at the national level, we will look at how international and regional 
protection clauses boil down to state level. 
102 Betts (2015), op. cit., f.n. 8, Hattaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015), op. cit., f.n. 100. 
103 Castles et.al. (2014), op. cit., f.n. 14, p. 7.
104 HLM draft declaration, op. cit., f.n. 3, point 2.2., 2.14, 3.18, annex 1, para 5(a),(e).
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Victimisation during migration does not lead to victim protection
Based on the EU Directive on the Short-term Residence Permit for Victims of 
Trafficking who Cooperate with Authorities in a criminal procedure, victims of 
trafficking are entitled a residence permit. This directive was adopted in 2004 and 
requires cooperation in a criminal procedure as a condition for a residence permit 
to be granted to victims of trafficking. Consequently, this places conditionality 
on protection and assistance. If a temporary residence permit is not granted, the 
victim cannot make use of the protection and assistance that should be provided. 
The EU Human Trafficking Directive and the Council of Europe Convention 
against Trafficking in Persons oblige EU member states and parties to the con-
vention to have a protection mechanism in place for victims of human trafficking. 
Trafficking victims are entitled to unconditional access to support and assistance, 
based on an individual risk assessment. However, the EU Human Trafficking 
Directive should be read in conjunction with the EU Directive on the Short-term 
Residence Permit. Clarifying the relationship between these two directives, the 
European Commission said that the unconditional access only applies during 
the reflection period and that assistance and protection after the reflection period 
can be made conditional on residence status. This limitation seriously hampers 
the obligation to provide unconditional access to support and assistance. Unless 
a criminal investigation into trafficking practices is initiated in which the victim 
does cooperate, the trafficking protection and support mechanism is not triggered. 
Remembering the practices of exploitation and trafficking experienced by 
migrants and refugees during the migratory process outlined previously, it is 
highly unlikely that authorities in an EU country will start an investigation against 
these practices. In most cases, it is also questionable whether, and to what extent, 
these authorities have jurisdiction to investigate practices that have taken place 
in a third country against non-residents or non-inhabitants. Second, cooperation 
with countries in which these practices have taken place, e.g. Libya and Sudan, 
should be carefully designed or completely avoided if these countries have 
weak democratic systems, failing governments or a questionable human rights 
reputation.105 Consequently, criminal investigations are not likely to commence 
105 S. Gless, Transnational Cooperation in Criminal Matters and the Guarantee of a Fair Trial: 
Approaches to a General Principle, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 9, issue 4, (2013). S. Betti, ‘New Prospects 
for Inter-state Co-operation in Criminal Matters: The Palermo Convention.’ International Criminal Law 
Review 3.2 (2003): 151–167.
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and migrants or refugees who were the victim of trafficking or exploitation during 
their migration will be deprived of the support and assistance they are entitled to 
as trafficking victims.
Non recognition of victimhood
However, even before special protection to victims of trafficking and violent 
smuggling can be granted, these victims have to be identified and recognized. 
Those who have applied for asylum and who do not bring their trafficking 
experience to the fore, are not easy to identify. Only if immigration officers are 
well trained and knowledgeable about the practices involved in trafficking and 
violent smuggling will they be able to identify victims of trafficking. Even if 
victims of trafficking are identified, the best way to proceed is not clear. In some 
countries in the EU there is a tendency for trafficking victims to prefer the asylum 
procedure over the procedure specifically designed for victims of trafficking. 
Those who have not submitted an asylum application and who remain in the 
country without legal residency are even more difficult to reach. Drawing on 
Gregor Noll’s analysis that undocumented migrants evade contact with the 
authorities, a parallel can be drawn with victims of human trafficking and violent 
smuggling. Victims from third countries often reside without legal residency, 
which makes them unwilling to report the trafficking to the authorities because 
of fear of detention, expulsion and reprisals by the trafficker. Furthermore, lack 
of legal residency makes them prone to re-victimisation, especially if they are 
indebted.106 Despite awareness raising programmes, the training of professionals 
and attention to the practices of human trafficking, only a small number of 
trafficking victims report to the authorities and even a smaller number are 
recognized as trafficking victims by law enforcement agencies.107
106 C. Rijken, J. van Dijk and F. Klerx, Mensenhandel: het slachtofferperspectief. Een verkennende studie 
naar behoeften en belangen van slachtoffers mensenhandel in Nederland, Wolf Legal Publishers, (2013) pp. 
59-66. 
107 With a new methodology to give more reliable estimates of trafficking victims, multiple systems 
estimations Jan van Dijk estimated earlier this year that in the Netherlands some 17.500 persons 
become victim of trafficking each year. The number of victims registered with Comensha was in the 
year 2015, 1321, which means that only some 7.5% of all the victims is being registered. K. Bales, O. 
Hesketh & B. Silverman (2015). Modern slavery in the UK: How many victims? Significance, 12(3), 
16–21.
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Professor Jayashri Srikantiah of Stanford Law School has studied the reasons for, 
and implications of, the non-recognition of trafficking victims. Building on Nils 
Chirstie’s theory of the ‘ideal victim’108,  Srikantiah refers to perfect victims and 
real survivors in human trafficking law.109 She critiques the current system, which 
makes the protection of trafficking victims conditional on their cooperation, and is 
even more critical of the distinction made by law enforcement authorities between 
illegal migrants and real trafficking victims. The explanation Srikantiah gives for 
the limited number of victims benefitting from the protection measures is the 
flawed understanding of victim volition and the stereotyped and one-sided image 
of victims of trafficking held by authorities and agencies. She claims that the 
ideal ‘deserving victim’, which she calls the ‘iconic victim’, serves to distinguish 
trafficked persons from undocumented migrants. The latter are considered to be 
male and undeserving, which is why their behaviour is increasingly criminalised. 
Trafficking victims are often portrayed as lacking free will during illegal entry and 
during exploitation. In reality, the picture is much more diverse and pressure, 
force or coercion can be used in many ways – some visible others less so. We have 
seen that people sometimes enter into situations of exploitation out of lack of any 
viable alternative for survival. The image of trafficking victims as will-less persons 
hampers their identification. Although in law human trafficking and human 
smuggling are clearly distinguishable, day-to-day practices do not reflect this 
distinction. People in a situation of exploitation or trafficking are often still able to 
exercise some free will, which may make the victim appear less meek or passive 
and, therefore, less innocent, in the eyes of law enforcement authorities.110 
The responsibility for the identification of trafficking victims and determining a 
victim’s cooperation (or non-cooperation) is put in the hands of prosecutors and 
law enforcement agencies. This dual function of these authorities is also critiqued 
by Srikantiah: 
  “…the LEA [law enforcement agencies] endorsement restriction transforms victim 
identification into a prosecutorial matter, not an assessment of a victim’s 
108 N. Christie, ‘The Ideal Victim’, in: E.A. Fattah (ed.), From Crime Policy to Victim Policy, MacMillan, 
(1986), pp. 17-30.
109 Srikantiah, op. cit., f.n. 20.
110 J. van Dijk, The Mark of Abel. Reflections on the Social Labelling of Victims of Crime, inaugural address, 
(2006), especially pp. 25-26, J. Goodey, Victims and Vitcimology. Research, Policy and Practice, Pearson 
Education Limited, Harlow, (2005) pp. 70-76. 
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  trafficking experience. The victims protection function of the TVPA [Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act] is subsumed by an implementation of prosecutorial goals 
that grants individual prosecutors and investigators maximum discretion in gran-
ting relief”.111 
Those who are voluntarily smuggled are not easily considered victims of 
trafficking, as trafficked persons are presumed to cross the border under the 
control of the trafficker.112 
111 Srikantiah, op. cit., f.n. 20, pp 181–182.
112 N. Christie, op. cit., f.n. 108, p. 25.
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Although there seem to be many reasons to be pessimistic about victimisation 
through migration, and about the global migration situation as a whole, some 
positive developments and possible solutions have emerged. 
Proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation
First, and based on the critiques of the Dublin system, the European Commission 
has proposed to again reform the Dublin Regulation. The former recast of the 
Dublin Regulation introduced a humanitarian clause in Article 3, stating that a 
migrant cannot be transferred to a member state if: 
  “…because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws 
in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that 
Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union…”113 
Because of this clause, all EU member states, apart from Cyprus, have suspended 
Dublin transfers to Greece. Following the Tarakhel-case and the humanitarian 
clause, some countries have (partly or temporarily) suspended Dublin transfers to 
Italy as well. 
A new proposal to amend the Dublin Regulation was tabled by the European 
Commission in May this year and is in line with the recommendations we made 
through the Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs in our report 
‘Sharing Responsibility’.114 Much of the current Dublin system will remain in 
place with some crucial adjustments. A key will be introduced for proportionately 
dividing the incoming migrants and refugees among EU member states. If a State 
has a 150% of its share, it can transfer the next incoming migrants and refugees to 
another member state. Furthermore, a broader definition of family membership 
will be introduced. This might lead to a more equal division of migrants and 
113 This was the outcome of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case before the European Court of 
Human Rights (Application no. 30696/09) and the NS case by the Court of Justice EU Case C-411/10 
and C-493/10
114 Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, Sharing Responsibility. A proposal for a European asylum 
system based on solidarity, (2016). COM(2016) 270 fin. Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast).
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refugees between the EU member states and give countries such as Greece and 
Italy an immediate claim vis a vis other EU member states.
Refugee status for trafficking victims
A second development – or maybe a solution – might be the application of refugee 
status to trafficked persons. At the moment, trafficking victims either chose the 
asylum procedure or a residence permit on account of being a trafficking victim. 
However, there is a third option and that is the granting of refugee status based 
on being a trafficking victim. As mentioned earlier, the definition in the Refugee 
Convention is a narrow one and does not automatically apply to victims of 
trafficking. In 2006, the UNHCR made a plea to apply the Refugee Convention to 
victims of human trafficking, as under certain circumstances human trafficking 
can be qualified as a form of persecution.115 Hathaway defines ‘persecution’ as 
“the sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a 
failure of state protection”116 and, therefore, international human rights law can 
help determine whether or not the acts to which a victim of trafficking has been 
subjected are of a persecutory nature. The UNHCR Guidelines on trafficking note 
that “persecution can be considered to involve serious human rights violations, 
including a threat to life or freedom, as well as other kinds of serious harm or 
intolerable predicament, as assessed in the light of the opinions, feelings and 
psychological make-up of the asylum applicant”.117 When considering the nature 
of the harm suffered or feared by victims of trafficking, the UNHCR Guidelines 
conclude that:
  “…inherent in the trafficking experience are such forms of severe exploitation as 
abduction, incarceration, rape, sexual enslavement, enforced prostitution, forced 
  labour, removal of organs, physical beatings, starvation, the deprivation of 
115 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons At 
Risk of Being Trafficked 7 April 2006 HCR/GIP/06/07 (UNHCR Guidelines on trafficking), Fadela 
Novak-Irons, “Unable to Return? – The Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Need of International 
Protection”, forthcoming in: Piotrowitz, Rijken and Uhl, Human Trafficking Handbook, Routledge, 
(2017); U. Jayasinghe and s. Baglay, ‘Protecting Victims of Human Trafficking Within a ‘Non-
Refoulement’ Framework: is Complementary Protection an Effective Alternative in Canada and 
Australia?’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 489-520.
116 JC Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Toronto Butterworths, (1991) pp. 104–105.
117 UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for determining refugee status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees Reissued 
December 2011 (UNHCR Handbook) para 51–53. 
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  medical treatment. Such acts constitute serious violations of human rights which 
will generally amount to persecution.”118 
While past persecution alone may not be accepted in many jurisdictions as 
sufficient to ground refugee status, the Guidelines explain that there may still be 
‘compelling reasons’ arising out of such past experience, which may require the 
granting of refugee status.119 
The next requirement is that one of the conventional grounds for persecution is 
present. For victims of trafficking, belonging to a social group is the most obvious 
one. The UNHCR Guidelines state that: 
  “Former victims of trafficking may also be considered as constituting a social 
group based on the unchangeable, common and historic characteristic of having 
been trafficked. A society may also, depending on the context, view persons who 
have been trafficked as a cognizable group within that society.”120 
Thus, although limited, those who were a victim of trafficking during the 
migratory process do have a chance of being granted international protection on 
account of being a victim of trafficking.  
De-linking victim protection and criminal procedure
As articulated by Srikantiah, the reliance on law enforcement agencies for victim 
identification and the dependence of victim protection and assistance on whether 
or not criminal procedures will commence are detrimental to victims of traffick-
ing. It is crucial that the police and other authorities or caregivers take victims 
of trafficking seriously. In contrast to practices used in the context of victims of 
other crimes, in the Netherlands victims of trafficking are referred to as ‘pre-
sumed victims’, who can only become a victim after the trafficking is conclusively 
determined in a criminal procedure. This seems to contradict the international-
ly-agreed definition of victim and is the reason why my esteemed colleague Marc 
Groenhuijsen and I intend to study this issue in the near future. 
118 UNHCR Guidelines on trafficking para 15.
119 UNHCR Guidelines son trafficking para 16.
120 UNHCR Guidelines on trafficking para 39.
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In the Netherlands, like in many other European and Western countries, the 
police play a crucial role in the identification of trafficking victims and, thus, in 
the granting of residency. If for whatever reason the police do not actively start an 
investigation (regardless of an obligation to do so), or if a suspect cannot be found, 
or if there are no reasons and indications to continue a criminal investigation, the 
victim loses his or her right to residency and, consequently, access to assistance 
and protection. 
In the Netherlands an option exists to receive a non-renewable residence permit 
for a maximum of one year without cooperating with the authorities, in case of 
psychological problems and threats of reprisal by the traffickers. Although 
cooperation is not required in such cases, the victim still needs to disclose enough 
information to the police for them to decide whether or not he or she can be 
considered a presumed trafficking victim. Hence, this option is only used in a 
limited number of cases. 
The main criticism of this systems is that law enforcement agencies should not 
make the decision on residency. Instead, this decision should be made by immi-
gration officers, independent of the criminal procedure.  The generally increased 
attention on the rights of victims and the strengthening of their position, especial-
ly over the last decade, has not equally affected the position of trafficking victims. 
Although a victim-centred approach has been articulated at the national, EU and 
international levels, such an approach has not been implemented in practice, 
as protection and support for victims of trafficking is strongly connected to the 
criminal procedure. Therefore, I am glad that, based on our earlier research and 
research by others who came to similar conclusions, the Dutch government has 
announced a pilot for multidisciplinary victim identification for those victims who 
have cooperated with the authorities, but whose cases have been dismissed or 
discontinued. This is a step in the right direction and we should further study the 
possibilities – including the consequences of further de-linking victim protection 
from the criminal procedure – and centralise the narrative of the victim in the pro-
cess. The Bureau of the National Rapporteur on human trafficking has proposed 
such an approach for unaccompanied minors,121 and we should explore how this 
can be extended to adult victims of trafficking as well. 
121 Bureau National Rapporteur on Human Trafficking, Mensenhandel. Naar een kindgericht 
beschermingssysteem voor alleenstaande minderjarige vreemdelingen, The Hague, (2015).
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These are some of the positive developments taking place in the landscape of 
human trafficking and global migration, but, unfortunately, it is far from enough. 
As an academic I feel a responsibility to contribute, in collaboration with 
colleagues from Tilburg Law School, as well as colleagues from other disciplines 
and other universities in and outside the Netherlands, to produce further 
knowledge that can be used to find solutions. And, I would like to give you a sneak 
preview of what this will look like in the near future. 
First, of all I would like to contribute to our understanding of what happens 
during the migration processes and filter that knowledge into the legal concepts 
of victimisation through migration. The fact that human trafficking and human 
smuggling can no longer be clearly distinguished, and the consequences of this 
increased overlap for victim protection, should be further analysed and conceptu-
alised. Together with colleagues from universities in the UK, Germany, Italy and 
Norway, we are currently preparing a research proposal on this topic. 
Second, and in the same context, the effects of the externalisation of migration 
management by the EU and EU member states needs to be understood in 
relation to the principle of non-refoulement. In addition, the responsibility of 
states and international organisations such as the EU for their extraterritorial 
activities in migration needs to be clarified and further analysed. The EU and EU 
member states should be cautious in their urge to manage migration processes 
in third countries and in concluding agreements with countries that are known 
not fall short of basic human rights standards, including practices of direct or 
indirect refoulement. Enforcing such agreements by paying enormous amounts 
of money to untrustworthy regimes, such as those of Sudan and Eritrea, feels 
like outsourcing ‘dirty work’ and should be avoided. The identification of the 
boundaries of these policies will remain one of the focus areas for future research. 
Third, our knowledge of the plight of urban refugees (including undocumented 
migrants), especially in the EU, is limited. I feel privileged to have the opportunity 
to work on this topic together with Hein Fleuren as programme directors of 
Data Science for Humanitarian Innovation. In this research we will collect and 
analyse primary data, first in Greece and later in other EU and non-EU countries. 
Students from the different schools of Tilburg University will be given the 
opportunity to work on this project. Combining this knowledge with the outcomes 
of the Gak research on undocumented migrants in the Netherlands will further 
46  Victimisation through migration
our knowledge on the human rights situation of those migrants and refugees. On 
a conceptual level, the question what human rights obligations exist for states, vis 
a vis those who reside within a state’s territory without residence status, needs to 
be further analysed. Furthermore, methods need to be developed to measure the 
impact of EU policy on the realisation of fundamental rights as adopted in the EU 
treaties and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. 
Fourth, we should creatively rethink global migration. Migration flows are not 
static, destinations are not static and migration is not necessarily a permanent 
situation. Apart from investing in integration and creating an environment of 
inclusion (instead of exclusion) and new layers in society, we should not disregard 
the aim of many migrants to ultimately return to their home country, once it is 
safe and opportunities are present. Anticipating return migration, and building on 
earlier scholarly work on return migration, we should expand our knowledge on 
the ways to facilitate return migration. The ultimate aim of such prepared return 
is for migrants to contribute to rebuilding their home countries. How can the 
host country, in collaboration with the diaspora, contribute to the well-prepared 
return of migrants, who can then play a role in rebuilding their country of origin? 
The diaspora is an important source of data on how such return migration can be 
designed. A first pilot of this research will be conducted among the Iraqi diaspora 
in the Netherlands and among those who have returned to Iraq. This pilot will 
be done in cooperation with IOM. Thus, we should invest in people arriving in 
Europe and the EU member states, not only for the benefit of our own economy, 
but for the benefit of their home countries once it is safe for them to return. 
Investing in those who arrive is investing in the rebuilding countries that are now 
embroiled in war or under oppressive regimes.  
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As you can see, plans for future research are numerous, and I am extremely 
thankful that I am being given the opportunity to conduct such research within 
the fantastic institute of Intervict. Motivated and driven by the need to enlarge our 
knowledge on the background and traumatic experiences of people on the move, 
as well as to contribute to evidence-based policy making, I am also grateful for the 
opportunity afforded to me by Tilburg University to contribute to the generation 
of such knowledge. But, without the support of others, I would not be standing 
here and I would like to take the opportunity to thank a few of them.
First of all, I am extremely grateful to the Executive Board of Tilburg University, 
especially Rector Magnificus Emile Aarts, and the faculty Board of Tilburg Law 
School, especially Dean Corien Prins, for their faith in me. I am thankful and 
honoured that I have been appointed to be the first professor in human trafficking 
and globalisation in the Netherlands, in Europe and, as far as I am aware, in the 
world. The establishment of this chair by Tilburg University reflects its 
commitment to the University’s slogan ‘understanding society’, as well as its 
international orientation and ambitions. 
Second, I would like to thank Comensha (the Dutch Coordination Centre  Human 
Trafficking), which sponsors part of my chair. Comensha is committed to 
strengthening the link between practice and academia and to supporting research 
on empowering victims of human trafficking. Many thanks for this commitment 
and I am looking forward to realising our plans.  
I was fortunate to undertake the first steps of my academic career under the 
supervision of Prof. Hirsch Ballin and Prof. Cyrille Fijnaut. When I was selected 
as a PhD candidate, I was probably not the most obvious choice. I had been 
working for years as a counsellor in psychiatric hospitals and was working for the 
immigration service at that time. I have always been extremely grateful that I was 
given the opportunity to embark on this academic path. I have learnt an awful lot 
from both my supervisors, who are still inspirational to me today.  
After my PhD was completed (in 2003) I was employed at the Department of 
European and International Law here at Tilburg University, where I was able 
to deepen and broaden my research on human trafficking where I became an 
experienced teacher and took on managerial responsibilities. I owe great gratitude 
to Prof. Willem van Genugten, the then ‘pater familias’ of the department, who 
gave me the room to spread my wings. Thank you for that Willem.
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My transfer to Intervict, for nearly three years now, has created new chances 
and opportunities thanks to Prof. Rianne Letschert, former director and ‘mater 
familias’ of Intervict – or ‘mother of all victimologists’. Dear Rianne, many thanks 
for creating this opportunity. I feel like a fish in water at Intervict. I am privileged 
to work with these fantastic people in an open and equal sphere. Thanks to my 
colleagues, who make every working day a joy, and a special thanks to Prof. 
Antony Pemberton, the current director, for facilitating this. 
The contacts with the students only add to this joy. Thank you for your enthusiasm, 
debates and lively discussions. 
Looking at the future, the sun is shining; as mentioned together with Hein Fleuren 
from the Tilburg School of Economics and Management (TiSEM), we will set up 
innovative and challenging projects within the programme Data Science on 
Humanitarian Innovation. Together with my dear colleague Mirjam van Reisen 
from the Tilburg School of Humanities, we will continue our ground-breaking 
research on smuggling and human trafficking. And, together with EIP colleague 
Nanda Oudejans, we will look at the processes of inclusion and exclusion in rela-
tion to integration in Europe. I am delighted to continue working with you and ex-
ploring new paths for researching these topics. Thanks; I am looking forward to it. 
On the social part of my work I am greatful to my dear mummy-friends Saskia, 
Anne-Marie and Rianne. Tonight you are not allowed to leave before we have a 
date for our Maastricht party.  
Maar een academische carrière is natuurlijk maar een deel van mijn leven. De 
onvoorwaardelijke steun die ik uit mijn omgeving ervaar van vrienden en 
vriendinnen, familie, broers, zussen en iedereen die daarbij hoort en van mijn 
lieve mama, zijn bijzonder en voelen als een stevig fundament. Fijn dat jullie hier 
vandaag allemaal zijn. Jullie zorgen ervoor dat ik met beide benen op de grond 
blijf staan en maken me duidelijk dat een te eenzijdige invulling van het dagelijks 
bestaan op den duur niet alleen saai is maar ook armoedig. Armoedig omdat je 
daardoor jezelf warmte, vriendschap en veel plezier onthoudt. Dank dat jullie 
me deze levenslessen bijbrengen en met mij blijven oefenen die in de praktijk te 
brengen. 
Victimisation through migration  51
En dan is er mijn gezin, Ruud, Jochem en Fien. In alle rankings steken jullie er 
met kop en schouders bovenuit. Zonder jullie is alles wat ik hiervoor heb gezegd 
en wat ik tot nu toe heb gedaan zinloos en overbodig. Lieve Fien, je bent de kleine 
klonny, een kloon van mama Conny en dat is niet alleen in uiterlijk zo. Jouw 
drang naar onafhankelijkheid en zelfstandigheid gaan je mooie dingen brengen. 
Lieve Jochem, je bent een heerlijke vent, genietend van het leven, je vrienden en 
vriendinnen, ambitieus en leergierig. Heerlijk om te zien. Lieve Ruud, jij komt als 
laatste aan de beurt maar dat is omdat je voor mij het meest belangrijk bent. Ik 
heb dit punt alleen kunnen bereiken dankzij jou. Jij staat altijd naast me, je bent 
het voorbeeld van de geslaagde emancipatie, en mijn grote steun en toeverlaat. 
Ik hoop dat dit nog lang zo mag blijven.
    Ik heb gezegd / I have spoken





Beelenkamp ontwerpers, Tilburg 
fotografie omslag
Maurice van den Bosch
druk
PrismaPrint, Tilburg University
Inaugural address, delivered by
Prof. dr. Conny Rijken
Victimisation 
 through Migration
Prof. dr. Conny Rijken is professor of Human Trafficking and 
Globalisation and deputy director of the International Victimology Institute 
Tilburg (INTERVICT). She is international law and human rights lawyer and 
has extended her field of research to other areas including global migration, 
European criminal law and inclusion and exclusion through migration. 
Central in her research is the focus on human rights and engagement with 
the position of the individual. She is member of the Advisory Committee on 
Migration Affairs and deputy judge at the district court of Zeeland and West-
Brabant.
